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Abstract 
This paper uses Malawian panel data to show the importance of geography and family 
relationships when studying remittances. We do not test any hypothesis as such, but 
instead demonstrate the significance of the source of remittances in testing hypotheses. 
When remittances are viewed from an insurance perspective, geography matters. 
Covariate (community) shocks tend to be insured further from home than 
idiosyncratic ones. When viewed from a motivational perspective, family relationship 
and culture matter. Furthermore, gift exchange amongst unrelated households can be 
as important as remittance flows amongst members of the same family in insuring 
shocks. Inter-household remittances are closely linked to social networks, with 
business and religious groups being particularly important (perhaps due to trust). 
Remittance flows are often reciprocal – receiving households often being the main 
senders, emphasizing their insurance nature.  
   (131 words) 
Keywords:  Remittances; Insurance; Household Economics; Malawi; Africa 
JEL Classification Codes: D190; D310; O180 
Page 3 of 33 
 
1 Introduction 
There has been an explosion in remittance flows since the early nineties with world 
wide flows to developing countries estimated to have doubled to US$65bn between 
1991and 1999 (Gammeltoft, 2002). Ratha (2007) estimates that total international 
remittance flows reached US$206bn in 2006 making them similar in value to Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) and over double the value of Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA). This increase has been reflected by a growing interest in 
remittance flows from policy makers and academics. There is now a wealth of 
literature studying the determinants of remittances; their impact; the motivations for 
remitting; remittances and migration; cost of remittances; internal and international 
remittances and other sub-topics. Such studies tend to assume that remittances are 
sent by family members who have migrated, either temporarily (such as the case of 
the husband who works away from home) or permanently (an educated child who 
emigrates from his or her home village to abroad or a city in search of formal 
employment).  
 
Although non-technical, this paper introduces a number of novelties which we believe 
need to be considered in more formal papers on remittances. The first novelty is to 
show the importance of the distance between the sending and receiving households. 
This is important in developing countries such as Malawi where the economy is 
largely rural and incomes depend on agriculture1 . Harvests depend upon weather 
patterns which exhibit decreasing correlation with distance thus insurance will be 
more effective the more distant are two households. Furthermore distance can impact 
on the moral hazard risk. For example an idiosyncratic shock of a household member 
being sick might be better insured within the village than further away since village 
members can witness the shock for themselves, whereas those living further away 
(abroad or in a large city for example) may be unable to ensure that their remittance is 
either require or used for the purpose for which it is intended. Our second novelty is 
to consider the relationship of the sender to the receiver. This has two key 
consequences: Firstly, many studies on remittances should to consider mutual gift 
exchange amongst unrelated neighbors and more distant relatives as well as those 
from close family members who have migrated. Secondly, the impact of remittances 
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depends upon motivations to remit, which are likely to differ depending upon the 
relationship of the sender to the receiver. For example, parents may receive 
remittances from a son for different reasons than those implied by remittances from 
village neighbors. It might be the case that the son remits to safeguard inheritance, 
while village remittances act as income pooling in order to reduce the risk from 
idiosyncratic shocks. Thus such a disaggregation is of academic interest to studies 
which test for motivations to remit, to those analyzing the extent to which remittances 
insure shocks; and to those attempting to understand household behavior in 
attempting to reduce consumption risk. 
 
In a literature review, Lucas (2006) reports that numerous studies indicate that in sub-
Saharan Africa migration and remittances are a family-strategy intended to mitigate 
risk. Azam and Gubert (2006) believe that “in most cases, the decision to migrate is a 
collective decision made by the extended family, or village, with a strategic view”. 
Income sharing and remittances are thus an important part of the decision to migrate. 
The authors do not follow up on the idea that remitting is not only a family activity 
but also a village one.  
 
In reality, remittances come from a variety of different sources, both geographically 
and with regards to the relationship between the sender and the receiver. Data from 
the Complementary Panel Survey (CPS) undertaken in Malawi between 2000 and 
2002 record incidences of remittances from different sources. These data show that 
more households receive remittances from friends and neighbors living in the same 
village than they do from family members. 
 
Azam and Gubert (2004; 2006) test for different motivations to remit and are unable 
to rule out either insurance, implicit loans or altruism. De la Brière et al (2002) find 
that there are elements of insurance and pure self-interest (safeguarding inheritance) 
in remittances. Van Dalen et al. (2005) note that “the inconclusive nature of empirical 
research is understandable. One cannot expect remittances to be driven by a single 
motive.” This is clearly the case when we examine remittance flows that are not 
disaggregated by sender and receiver, but a greater level of disaggregation may help 
to assess motivations to remit in more detail. 
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Remittances are often a form of insurance undertaken as part of an intra-family 
strategy, but these flows also exist between families. An inter-household perspective 
is justified in some cases; for example where remittances are overwhelmingly sent 
from abroad by migrant workers (Mexico or El Salvador). Other examples include 
Clarke and Wallsten (2003), who find that remittances from abroad insured 25% of 
cost of damage caused by Hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica in 1988.  
 
An inter-household perspective is also justified where sending and receiving 
households are matched, with information on both participants on both sides of the 
transaction (e.g. van Dalen et al., 2005). In many cases however ignoring the origin of 
the transfer both in geographical and relationship terms prevents answering key 
questions about the nature of these flows. 
 
Knowing who has sent the remittance is important when testing motivations to remit. 
For example, custom dictates who inherits the wealth of a deceased person. If the data 
allow the user distinguish between different remitters, comparisons can be made 
between the remittance behavior of those from different tribes with different 
inheritance customs. Azam and Gubert (2006) find that where a village has a large 
number of emigrants, there is competition to support their families’ relative income 
for reasons of familial pride. Here again, an understanding of the source of 
remittances is important if the extent of such behavior is to be gauged. 
 
A knowledge of the geographical provenance of the transfer helps to distinguish 
insurance elements of transfers. Idiosyncratic shocks affecting only the household (the 
death of a key household member for example) may be better insured within the 
village, whilst covariate shocks affecting the whole village (floods or livestock 
diseases, for example) need to be insured further afield. 
 
Mutual gift-giving is common in sub-Saharan Africa and social networks play an 
important role in these inter-household transfers. Our data show that belonging to a 
regional business club, religious group or social club increases the likelihood of both 
giving and receiving remittances. Furthermore, the insurance element of such cultural 
behavior has additional implications (supported by the finding in this paper): 
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wealthier households are more likely to receive remittance because they make safer 
insurers during bad times.  
 
This paper is discursive in nature and aims to highlight the importance of greater 
information regarding the character of remittance flows. We take the view that 
transfers in the form of remittances or gifts have a large insurance component and 
react to shocks at household and village level. This is in line with a number of other 
studies. Pan (2007) finds that negative idiosyncratic shocks to household income in 
rural Ethiopia are insured by pooling risk through remittances, but that covariate 
shocks are not; Pan (2007) does not, however, consider the geographical source of the 
remittances. Harrower and Hoddinott (2005) examine the extent to which households 
in rural Mali insure against a series of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. They find 
that gift-giving (cash remittances or gifts in-kind) are especially used by asset poor 
households to partially insure shocks. Unfortunately, they are unable to distinguish 
the source of the remittances. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) use longitudinal southern 
Indian village data to find that most migrants are females who leave their village of 
origin to live with new spouses. Household intermarriage is, in part, a response to 
income risk. Since agriculture generates the largest part of income, such risk is 
dependant partly upon weather and is thus spatial in nature. Daughters tend to marry 
into a region whose weather patterns are as uncorrelated as possible (given the 
financial constraint implied by cost of travel) with her region of origin. Thus, in 
insurance, geography matters. 
 
Viewing gifts or remittances as having a large insurance component is compatible 
with the view that other motivations also impact on remittances. For example, in order 
to safeguard inheritance a child may be expected to increase remittances when the 
household of origin suffers a shock. We briefly discuss household coping strategies 
following shocks and record several measures of correlation between transfers and 
shocks. 
 
The following section discusses findings from previous work related to the nature of 
shocks in Malawi and the coping strategies used with a focus on remittances. Section 
three introduces the data and discusses the characteristics of remittance senders and 
receivers; section four analyses remittance flows and sections five and six use 
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correlations to assess associations between remittances of different sources 
(geographical and personal relationship to receiver) and household shocks in order to 
emphasize the insurance nature of the remittances. The final section concludes. 
2 Remittances as Coping Strategy following Shocks 
Households engage in a variety of coping strategies during seasons of scarcity 
including selling their casual labor and borrowing. In Malawi, as in other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa, remittances play an important role in insuring/smoothing household 
consumption. 
 
Transfers can be viewed as imperfect substitutes for credit, which is itself an 
important coping strategy during the “hungry season (Bokosi, 2001). The 
substitutability between credit and remittances is highlighted by Udry (1990), who 
finds that loan repayment conditions in northern Nigeria are a function of the relative 
shocks faced by the borrowing and lending households. Devereux et al. (2006) expand 
on this noting that different shocks impact households at different levels. That is, 
there exist idiosyncratic risks which largely impact only on the household which 
suffers (such as the death of a key household member), and different covariant shocks 
which may impact most other households in the village (floods) or region (drought).  
 
Using data from the 2004 Malawian Integrated Household Survey, Devereux et al. 
(2006) show that over three quarters of Malawian households have faced severe 
shocks during the previous 5 years.  Some of these shocks are idiosyncratic whilst 
others are covariate in nature, impacting on a larger number of people. Shocks 
impacting on different households need to be insured differently. So a (visible) 
idiosyncratic shock may be most easily insured through exchanging gifts with 
different community members. More widespread shocks such as droughts may require 
remittance flows from further afield. Table 1 shows households reporting being 
affected by different shocks in Malawi. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The link between migration, remittances and insurance is highlighted by the 2006 
Malawian Migration Baseline Survey (MBS) which interviewed 9,546 respondents, 
of whom 736 were migrants. It looked at the link between migration and remittances 
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and found that remittances contribute an average of 6% to total household income 
with farming produce adding an additional 31%, casual labor contributed 27% and 
wage employment 18%. 
 
27% of household only sent remittances, with the report assuming the beneficiary was 
always a worker away from home. 15% of household received remittances and 17% 
both sent and received remittances. The fact that nearly one fifth of households 
engaged in both sending and receiving remittances helps to show the importance of 
remittances as insurance devices with households both giving and receiving rather 
than simply redistributing income in and for itself. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that 
a quarter of households are supporting workers away from home, helping to reinforce 
the theory that a part of all transfers are being made between family units as well as 
within them. 
 
The findings also indicate that male migrants are more likely to remit than female 
migrants with two thirds of males remitting against one third of females. This is likely 
to be a reflection of the reasons for migrating. Men are more likely than females to 
migrate for employment, keeping connections with their family at home, while 
females are more likely to migrate for marriage, hence severing home ties.  
 
Although difficult to assess due to the fungibility of assets, the MBS asked 
respondents about the use of remittances and found the primary use to be food with 
water and medical bills also being important (see Table 2). These spending patterns 
are indicative of the insurance nature of remittances. Households receive transfers in 
order to help cope with shocks such as the need to pay urgent medical bills, or to 
ensure adequate food consumption during seasons of scarcity. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3 Givers and Takers: Descriptive Data 
This paper uses the Malawian Complimentary Panel Survey (CPS) undertaken by the 
Centre for Social Research (CSR) in Malawi with technical assistance from the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) between January 2000 and July 
2002. Four rounds of interviews were conducted with 758 households in round 1; 667 
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in round 2; 631 in round 3 and 499 in round 4. The panel is thus unbalanced with 
households being interviewed between one to four times, and in different 
combinations of rounds. For example, a household might have been interviewed 
during rounds 1, 2 and 4. There is no replacement, so information on major household 
characteristics such as the education of the household head (assumed to remain 
unchanged) was collected in the first round. Each round comprised of a household 
questionnaire and individual questionnaires, and data have been combined where 
appropriate. Supplementary questions were asked during certain rounds pertaining to 
membership of social networks; language spoken in the home and asset ownership. 
Since such information was not collected during the first round, there are missing 
variables for some households. This does not pose a problem for this paper, which is 
descriptive in nature. A more analytical study would have to deal with this missing 
information in a more technical manner.  
 
Malawi is consistently ranked in the bottom fifteen of the world’s poorest countries 
by the UNDP’s Human Development Indicators. It is landlocked but has suffered no 
external conflict or serious internal conflict since independence in 1964. The adult 
literacy rate is around sixty-four percent (World Bank Development Indicators, 2007) 
and the country suffers severely from the HIV/AIDS epidemic with an estimated 
fifteen percent prevalence rate reducing current life expectancy from around fifty-five 
years to under forty (Conroy et al., 2006: p.64). The economy is largely rural and 
agricultural with around 85% of the population living in rural areas and agriculture 
occupying nearly 90% of the workforce and contributing around 35% of GDP (World 
Bank Development Indicators, 2007). 
 
Malawi’s history of migration combined with its lack of formal financial 
infrastructure means that remittances have developed as an important means of 
minimizing risk and are thus an important source of both income and expenditure for 
households. This is the case for both intra-family and inter-household transfers. Our 
data indicate that remittances make up nearly 12.5% of household income, and around 
9% of expenditure, for those who send them. Transfers from NGOs and from 
Malawi’s significant overseas diaspora help to make up the difference in between 
remittance income and expenditure. Traditional gift exchange is an important part of 
rural life in Malawi, helping to smooth consumption and decrease risk faced with the 
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lack of accessible financial infrastructure. This makes Malawi an ideal setting to study 
remittance flows from an insurance perspective, and indeed, from many other 
perspectives. 
 
Descriptive statistics reveal informative differences between households which remit 
and those which do not, and between household which receive remittances and those 
which do not. In particular, the data reveal that senders and receivers exhibit very 
similar characteristics different from the wider population. 
 
One outstanding result is that remitters are more likely to receive remittances 
themselves, and receivers are more likely to remit than the total sample. 41% of 
receivers also remit against 32% of the total sample and 46% of senders also receiver 
against 36% of the total sample. Remittances are flowing in both directions 
suggesting that there is a strong insurance motive for these flows. It is unfortunate that 
sending and receiving households are not matched making it difficult to tell if two 
households engage regularly in mutual gift exchange. 
 
Sending and receiving household heads tend to have better education (6.01 and 5.37 
years respectively) than the average of 4.61 years. Furthermore senders and receivers 
are more likely to be better connected than other households. 32% of sending 
household heads and 57% of receiving household heads reported belonging to a local 
business group2  compared with around 13% for households that neither send nor 
receive remittances. 52% of sending household heads and 57% of receiving household 
heads reported belonging to a religious group compared with 48% percent of the 
whole sample. Senders and receivers also tend to be slightly more involved in 
political groups (local parties) and social groups (such as sports or acting clubs or 
women’s groups). 
 
These results should not be surprising. It could be that these groups offer a secure 
environment within which gift exchange can be carried out. Membership of a 
religious organization might encourage trust for example. Furthermore, gift exchange 
within the context of a club might increase the social penalties associated with non-
reciprocation, helping to increase security. 
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A further reason why households which participate in remittance flows tend to be 
better connected than other households may relate to social and economic standing. 
Members of business clubs may have higher or more secure income, and receive gifts 
from others because they are seen as good people to have in a social network in times 
of difficulty. Other desirable groups to have in ones social network are those with 
salaried jobs; senders and receivers are both more likely to have a household member 
with a salaried job. The causality in these examples is likely to go both ways. Those 
with better jobs or steadier income are more likely to be able to remit and would tend 
to be amongst the “best” people to have in a social network ensuring they also receive 
remittances. 
 
It is notable that senders and receivers have significantly higher asset scores3 and 
consumption levels than other households. In short, sending and receiving households 
are wealthier than the average. 
 
Other noteworthy characteristics suggest that familial links are important. For 
example, female household heads are more likely to receive remittances (perhaps 
from husbands elsewhere) and less likely to send remittances than the average. 
Sending and receiving households are more likely than the average to have a head that 
has migrated from another district in Malawi. Receivers are less likely to be married 
than the average – perhaps because these consist partly of young people setting up in 
a city or urban centre who receive assistance from their parents. 
 
Finally a few other characteristics are of interest. Households that send remittances 
tend to be younger than other groups, and nearly 3 ½ years younger than the sample 
average; those who sent remittances are much more likely to have accessed credit 
within the previous year (23% against a sample average of 15%); around fifteen 
percent of sending and receiving households are urban compared with nine percent of 
the whole sample. 
4 Remittances Flows 
This section presents an overview of the remittance flows in Malawi using both 
pooled data and by survey round. Here, we also expand on the idea that there is a 
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positive correlation between sending remittances and receiving them, emphasizing the 
importance of mutual exchange and the insurance nature of this flow of money.  
4.1 Pooled 
Of the 2555 observations from 758 households, 910 reported receiving remittances of 
on average nearly MK600 per month or around US$8.20 using the average exchange 
rate for the period during which the survey was undertaken4. This is a significant 
amount in a country where over 60% of the population live in poverty (Benson et al., 
2002) and an average yearly per capita income in 2005 of around US$160 (WDI, 
2006). Many households receive remittances from more than one relation and from 
different places. More incidences of remittances come from within the same village 
with these amounts being the smallest in value. Thus, remittances from close to home 
are the lowest in value but most frequent. Remittances from within the village are 
given by both neighbors and relatives. Indeed, neighbors remit more often than any 
other group with nearly a third of all receiving households reporting income from 
neighbors. Although the amounts tend to be less than half of the mean remittance 
value, inter-household remittances are an important source of income and insurance 
for many households. 
 
Table 3 offers other interesting insights into transfer flows. Ignoring NGO transfers, 
remittances from spouses tend to be the highest in value, presumably because the 
spouse is working away from home and remitting money as part of an intra-household 
strategy. It is interesting to note that paternal relatives give almost double maternal 
ones on average but give less regularly. Further work needs to be undertaken to 
uncover the impact of matrilineal versus patrilineal social structures that exist within 
the different tribal groups of Malawi. These results are only indicative as in some 
rounds maternal and paternal relatives were not separated and classed together under 
"relation". 
 
Remittances from abroad are the highest in value on average, but few households 
received these transfers5. Remittances from children make up a large proportion of the 
incidences of remittances, and are relatively high in value. These flows come with 
attached hypotheses for testing motivations to remit. Remittances from children to 
parents should not decline with distance if inheritance is the motivation and may 
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increase with distance if insurance is the motivation due to lower correlation between 
weather patterns and hence crop output risk (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). 
Remittances from parents might be either (a) part of an intra-family strategy; (b) 
helping a youngster setting up a new home; (c) altruistic help following a negative 
shock or (d) insurance payments. 
[Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Givers are Receivers: Some Correlations 
Simple correlations between sending and receiving remittances offer further insights 
into the risk-sharing behavior of households. Table 4 shows a positive and significant 
correlation between giving and receiving remittances. Although positive, the 
correlation between the amount sent and the amount received is not significantly 
different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Further assessment can be made by tabulating correlations between sending 
remittances to and receiving them from different geographical areas and different 
relations. These results are summarized here, and presented in Appendix 2. Here, we 
focus on the results of correlations between dummies indicating whether or not a 
household sends and receives remittances rather than the correlations between the 
values. This is because, even under an insurance hypothesis, there is no reason to 
assume the values will be similar over a short period. Since however, values are of 
interest, these results are presented in Appendix 2 and are discussed here where they 
are of interest. 
 
The correlations offer one outstanding result. There are positive and significant 
correlations between the dummies indicating receipt of and sending remittance to 3 
out of the 5 areas studied. There is a positive association between sending remittances 
to people in the same village, district, and other districts and receiving remittance 
from these places. There is also a positive and significant correlation between the 
amount sent and received from the village. The lack of correlation between sending 
and receiving remittances overseas should not be surprising as these flows are more 
likely to be largely one-way. 
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There are positive (and significant) associations between sending remittances to and 
receiving them from one’s parents, children, siblings, all relatives and neighbors. 
Many of these positive correlations are echoed by correlations between the amount of 
remittances sent and received. This is especially the case for the value of remittances 
sent to and received from children, all relatives and neighbors. 
 
It should not be surprising that there is no correlation between giving and receiving 
from one’s spouse as these flows tend to be dominated by a husband working away 
from home, and remitting money to support his family. Thus, these flows are only 
one-way. 
 
Although only simple correlations, these results help to reinforce the hypothesis that 
households share income in order to minimize risk, and that the same households both 
give and receive remittances. 
4.3 Rounds 
The panel nature of the data allows us to plot changes over time. Table 5 shows a 
general increase in the value of remittances being sent over the 3 years of the 
Complimentary Panel Survey from just over MK100 per month in January 2000 to 
over MK330 in July 2002. The percentage of households receiving remittances 
fluctuates between 28% and over 60%. 
 
With the exception of July 2001, the percentage of households sending remittances 
remains steady at around one third. The value of the average remittance expenditure 
however, varies considerably. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 below show remittance income and expenditure by survey 
round and source. More households are engaged in sending and receiving remittances 
within their own village. The general rule is then that fewer households are engaged 
in exchange of remittance as distance increases. The average amount sent and 
received however tends to be higher outside of the home villages.  
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Neighbors, siblings, children and parents engage in remittances on both the sending 
and receiving side, helping to highlight the importance of both inter-family and intra-
household remittances. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The general trend for sending remittances is relatively steady for all sources. The 
exception is the percentage of households remitting to neighbors. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The large increase in round 4 may, at first glance, seem to represent some selection 
bias but, although this cannot be entirely discounted, another explanation is more 
likely. The final round was conducted in the aftermath of one of Malawi’s worst 
harvests in recent times. Many parts of the country were hit by floods and others by 
droughts. This came on top of a reduction in government and donor assistance for 
subsistence farmers, who provide bulk of Malawi’s food6. Production of the main 
staple food, maize, was down by around 37% compared with 2 years previously. 
Average maize prices in the six months to the survey were nearly 3 times the same 
period in the previous year. This was the second of 2 bad harvests for Malawi, and the 
situation was declared a “disaster” by the government, which sought outside help7.  
 
Such a desperate situation causes informal insurance networks to be used to a greater 
extent. This is the major factor in determining the increase in remittance flows. Table 
6 divides salaried and non-salaried households by round. Households which have a 
member working in a salaried job (outside of the farming sector) are likely to be hit 
less hard than those which rely on farming for their survival. 
 
It is noteworthy that the income before remittances of non-salaried households as a 
percentage of salaried households decreases from around one third to just over 15% in 
the aftermath of the poor harvest in 2002. Non-salaried households are likely to turn 
both to each other and to those with steadier streams of income for help and, 
unsurprisingly, a full two thirds of salaried households reported sending remittances 
during this time. 
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Interestingly, a greater proportion of all households (salaried or not) reported 
receiving remittances during this time and 62% of non-salaried households reported 
sending remittances. This could reflect both the insurance and altruistic natures of 
remittances. Anticipating even worse times ahead (June and July are months of 
relative maize abundance compared with later in the year), non-salaried households 
attempt to fully insure themselves with their salaried counterparts. Meanwhile, 
witnessing those in even more need than themselves around them, they also give to 
other poor households. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
5 Responses to Idiosyncratic Shocks: Some More Correlations 
This section discusses correlations between dummies and amounts indicating receipt 
of remittances from each source and various shocks. All correlations are based on 
pooled data so that a positive correlation between a shock and remittances from a 
particular source indicates a positive association between a shock suffered since the 
previous round and remittance income from the source specified. Correlations are 
presented in Appendix II with key points discussed below. 
5.1 Receipt of Remittances 
Overall there is a positive association between receiving remittances and having had a 
member leave the household and successfully find work. There is increased likelihood 
of receiving remittance from outside of the village (anywhere) but remittance flows 
from the village are negatively associated with this variable. The strong positive 
association between receiving remittances from one’s spouse and having had a 
member leave to successfully find work suggests that it is usually men who leave to 
find work and then remit. There appears to be a crowding out effect as other relatives 
and village members cease to contribute. Interestingly gifts from NGOs are positively 
associated with having had a member leave the household to successfully find work 
as the household is now likely to be female-headed and thus deemed potentially 
vulnerable by NGOs. 
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There is a negative association between a household receiving remittances and a 
member leaving to get married. Perhaps gifts are (temporarily) redirected towards the 
newly weds to assist them in setting up home. 
 
There is a positive association between receiving remittances and having had a sick 
child or female in the household. Neighbors and more distant relatives respond to 
children being sick in particular (it is difficult to see the causality being the other way 
around). Children tend to respond to an illness of an adult female (usually the mother) 
in the household. 
 
There is a negative association between receiving remittances from relatives and 
having had a member leave to go and leave with a relative. There seems to be a 
certain degree of substitutability between financing a child’s upbringing in another 
household and bringing them up personally.  
5.2 Sending Remittances 
Unsurprisingly there is a negative association between having suffered from most 
shocks and the amount of remittances sent, although not all are significant at the 10% 
level. For example, there is a negative link between having had a baby and the amount 
of remittances sent. There are however, some interesting exceptions to this rule. 
 
Remittances expenditure is positively associated with having had a child leave to live 
with a relative. In particular more remittances are sent to certain groups – presumably 
those who take in the children – such as maternal relatives. This is consistent with the 
finding that income from remittances is negatively associated with a child leaving. 
 
Interestingly, having any sick members is positively associated with remittance 
expenditure to several groups. The dummies indicate that, in the case of sick children, 
money is less likely to go to neighbors, but more likely to go to certain relatives. It 
could be that these remittances are part of an implicit payment for services received 
during the difficult period. This positive association may be linked to the positive 
association between illness and increased remittance income. Since the interview 
rounds are approximately a year apart there is ample time for a member to contract an 
illness, receive remittances to help pay for treatment, and then “repay” after having 
Page 18 of 33 
recovered. This creates remittance flows in both directions, and helps to reinforce the 
hypothesis of a certain degree of substitutability between credit and remittances.  
6 Covariate Shocks: Even More Correlations 
Shocks which impact on an entire community are difficult to insure within that 
community.  Thus, when a community is affected by a flood or drought, it should be 
anticipated that remittance receipts from within that community decrease. 
 
Table 7 presents correlations between dummies indicating whether a region has been 
effected by a flood, a drought, or especially high maize prices relative to the rest of 
the country during the six months previous to the survey round, and dummies 
indicating whether or not a household received remittances from each of several 
sources. Information relating to prices and climates were obtained from the Famine 
Early Warning System Network “Food Security Reports” for Malawi and shocks are 
largely at a district level. Thus, these data are not village specific. Although not 
perfect, these data are used in the absence of anything more perfect, and give a 
reasonably accurate assessment of shocks affecting most, if not all, of the villages 
within the area. 
 
As expected, there are negative correlations between the dummy indicating whether 
or not a village/district has suffered from a flood and remittances from this area. It is 
interesting to note that the negative correlation is significant only at district level, but 
that the degree of correlation approximately decreases by distance, turning positive 
for “Other Urban”. It is expected that data indicating a greater degree of 
disaggregation of shocks would render more significant shocks at the lower, village, 
level. 
 
“Drought” follows a similar pattern. A drought within a locality is difficult to insure 
within that locality, explaining the negative correlations between “Drought” and 
“Village” and “District” with the latter being significant at the 10% level. In this case, 
there is a positive and significant correlation between “Drought” and “Other Urban”. 
Thus, if a household has suffered from a recent drought, it is more likely to receive 
remittances from a (distant) urban area. 
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“High Maize Price” indicates whether or not a district had higher maize prices than 
the rest of the country at the time of the survey. Here the impact is ambiguous as 
purchasing power of households without maize to sell is reduced while it is increased 
for those with excess maize. The positive correlation indicates that those with maize 
to sell, dominate. 
 
Average and Current Maize Price are both continuous variables. These are highly 
correlated and follow the same pattern. As with “High Maize Price”, there are positive 
correlations between the price and whether or not a household receives remittances 
from their village or district. This should not be surprising as high prices mean the 
many households with surpluses to sell will have more money to remit. Thus supply 
of potential remittances is increasing. In addition, households which need to purchase 
maize due to a shortfall will find themselves with lower purchasing power. This will 
increase the demand for remittances (either as an altruistic flow, or as repayment of an 
implicit loan, or as an insurance payment). It is also interesting to note the negative 
(and significant) correlation between maize prices and the urban dummy. Urban 
households are less likely to benefit from an increase in maize prices through selling 
produce, and will suffer the resulting increase in cost. Thus, this association is not 
surprising. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
7 Conclusion 
This paper has used Malawian data to emphasize the importance of considering the 
source of remittance income when evaluating the motivations for remitting and the 
impacts of this source of income. The aim of the paper has not been to test any 
hypothesis as such, but simply to demonstrate the importance of the source of 
remittance in testing hypotheses. The data indicate that an important part of 
remittance flows are made with the intention of reducing risk, and that remittances 
between different families are as important as those within families. Furthermore, 
covariate shocks impacting on whole communities are insured outside of that 
community acting, in the case of a shock, to decrease the remittances from that 
community but increase remittance flows from elsewhere. 
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Remitting sending and receiving households exhibit similar characteristics, and those 
that send remittances often receive them, and vice versa. Social networks including 
business clubs and religious organizations play a role in determining to whom one 
remits. Extended family can also be seen as a social network. 
 
In order to assess the extent to which remittances respond to insurance following 
different shocks, more technical, panel data analysis can be used. Remittances from 
different geographical provenances can be expected to respond differently depending 
upon the shock suffered. Furthermore, different family members may respond to 
different shocks depending upon tribal customs. Other questions these data permit to 
answer relate to the extend to which income shocks are insured, and, in particular, 
whether family members respond to relative income shocks as well as absolute 
income shocks. This is in line with Azam and Gubert (2006) who find that migrated 
members of households sometimes see themselves in competition to maintain the 
living standards of their family in Senegal.  
 
Although non-technical, this paper has shown the importance of the source of 
remittances, and lays the ground for more work to be undertaken in this area. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Agriculture contributes 35% to GDP and earns 90% of export earnings in Malawi (Simler, 1997). 
Smallholder farmers are the “breadbasket” of the economy. 84% of agricultural production comes from 
around 2 million smallholder households cultivating one hectare of land or less (Conroy et al., 2006: 
p.24; Mkandawire, 1999: p.44). 
2 Local business groups are primarily farmers’ clubs, or talking shops for shop-keepers or maize traders. 
3 Assets used in the factor analysis include ownership of livestock, ownership of household furniture 
(e.g. tables, bed, chairs), household appliances and similar (e.g. radio, cooker, bicycle), and variables 
indicating quality of home (quality of walls, roofing, floor), access to electricity and water and number 
of hectares of land owned by the household. The asset index takes an average value of zero and follows 
a normal distribution. 
4 The exchange rate during the period during which the survey was undertaken averages around US$1 
= MK73.2. 
5 Only 3% of all remittance incidences are from abroad. 
6 84% of Malawi’s agricultural production comes from around 2 million smallholder households 
cultivating one hectare of land or less (Conroy et al., 2006: p.24; Mkandawire, 1999: p.44). 
7 Information in this paragraph is collated from several Famine Early Warning System Network “Food 
Security Reports” available from www.fews.net. See in particular the report for mid-February to mid-
March, 2002, released on 19th March, 2002. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Shocks faced by Malawian households (HH) over previous 5 years and nature of shocks 
Source: Devereux et al. (2006) 
 
Table 2: Uses of Remittances Cited by Respondents of 2006 Malawi Migration Baseline Survey 
 Rural Urban 
Food 46.0% 75.0% 
Water 25.6% 5.4% 
Medicine 20.1% 13.4% 
Source: Adapted from NSO (2006) 
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Table 3: Remittance Income by Source 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Geographical Provenance           
Same Village 476 194.35 542.25 0.2 7000 
Same District 293 381.82 855.69 1 10000 
Another District 207 1186.44 8409.10 3 120000 
Another Urban Centre 54 684.44 1335.34 20 8000 
Abroad 27 2057.33 3068.18 15 11000 
Relation           
Parent 87 240.37 748.67 5 6490 
Child 194 477.25 883.43 2 9600 
Grandchild 31 217.47 497.34 5 2717 
Sibling 209 544.79 1586.06 0.5 11000 
Paternal Relative 54 225.86 428.99 3 2070 
Maternal Relative 80 122.29 202.92 0.2 1200 
Relation 103 271.98 477.94 1 2800 
Neighbor 287 222.90 603.78 1 7000 
Employee 5 178.00 85.26 30 250 
NGO 12 10919.17 34423.72 20 120000 
Spouse 19 1225.26 2502.29 5 11000 
Other 51 802.39 1313.86 10 6004 
Total Remittance Income 910 598.01 4129.66 0.2 120000 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey 
 
Table 4: Correlations between Giving and Receiving Remittances 
  
Total 
Remittances 
Received 
Remittance 
Receipt 
Dummy 
Total 
Remittances 
Sent 
Remittance 
Sent Dummy 
Total Remittances 
Received 
1    
Remittance Receipt 
Dummy 
0.1155* 1   
Total Remittances 
Sent 
0.0315 0.0211 1  
Remittance Sent 
Dummy 
0.0499* 0.1434* 0.2424* 1 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * indicates significance at the 10% 
level. 
 
Table 5: Percentage of Households Receiving Remittances and Average Remittance by Round 
Interview Round Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
% Households Receiving Remittances 28.2% 32.7% 26.5% 62.3% 
Average Remittance Income (MK) 105.5 120.2 343.0 335.9 
% Households Sending Remittances 33.0% 33.4% 25.4% 34.9% 
Average Remittance Expenditure (MK) 93.2 66.6 69.3 165.9 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey 
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Figure 1: Receipt of Remittance by Source, Percentage Households and Average Values 
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Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; Raw data and standard deviations 
in Table 13 to Table 16 in Appendix III. 
 
Figure 2: Sending Remittance to Different Destinations, Percentage Households and Average 
Values 
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Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; Raw data and standard deviations 
in Table 13 to Table 16 in Appendix III. 
 
Table 6: Differences between Households with a Salaried Member and without, by Round 
  Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
  
Salaried 
Households 
Non-
Salaried 
Households 
Salaried 
Households 
Non-
Salaried 
Households 
Salaried 
Households 
Non-
Salaried 
Households 
Salaried 
Households* 
Non-
Salaried 
Households 
Income Before 
Remittances 
48922.72 15069.80 5765.37 1647.56 11181.28 3891.31 15974.92 2544.95 
% Households 
Receiving 
Remittances 
0.46 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.39 0.23 0.55 0.33 
% Households 
Sending 
Remittances 
0.35 0.27 0.37 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.66 0.62 
Non-Sal as % Sal 30.8% 28.6% 34.8% 15.9% 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * one extreme outlier has been 
excluded. 
 
Table 7: Receipt of Remittances following Shocks Impacting on Community 
  Flood Drought 
High 
Maize 
Price 
Average 
Maize 
Price 
Current 
Maize 
Price 
Flood 1         
Drought -0.0321 1     
High Maize Price 0.2133* -0.0213 1    
Average Maize Price -0.0838* -0.0943*   0.1974* 1   
Current Maize Price 0.1290* -0.0839*   0.2032* 0.7980* 1 
Village -0.0268 -0.0131    0.0753* 0.2612* 0.1765*   
District -0.0490* -0.046*  0.0537* 0.1581* 0.1117*  
Other District -0.0201 0.0306 0.0125 0.1174* 0.0889*  
Other Urban 0.0091 0.0462* -0.0245 -0.0347* -0.0385* 
Abroad 0.0064 -0.0132 -0.0172 0.0302 0.0227 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; All variables are dummies except 
Current and Average Maize Prices. Current Maize Price is the average national maize price and 
Average Maize Price is the average nationwide maize price over the previous 6 months as reported by 
the Famine Early Warning System Network “Food Security Reports” for Malawi available from 
www.fews.net; * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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Appendix 1: Table 8: Selected Descriptive Statistics for Different Groups of Household 
Variable Whole Sample 
Remittance Receiving 
Household 
Non-Receiving 
Households 
Remittance Sending 
Households 
Non-Sending 
households 
  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Age of Head 688 45.91 15.94 190 45.33 14.46 498 46.13 16.48 228 42.54 14.32 460 47.58 16.44 
Education of Head (years) 757 4.61 3.88 214 5.37 4.11 543 4.31 3.75 249 6.01 3.99 508 3.92 3.63 
Female Head Dummy 758 0.24 0.43 214 0.26 0.44 544 0.23 0.42 250 0.16 0.37 508 0.28 0.45 
Internal Migrant Dummy 754 0.24 0.42 213 0.27 0.44 541 0.22 0.42 249 0.28 0.45 505 0.22 0.41 
International Migrant 
Dummy 754 0.06 0.23 213 0.04 0.20 541 0.06 0.24 249 0.05 0.22 505 0.06 0.23 
Head Married Dummy 754 0.74 0.44 213 0.69 0.46 541 0.76 0.43 249 0.81 0.39 505 0.70 0.46 
Head Divorced Dummy 758 0.07 0.26 214 0.09 0.29 544 0.07 0.25 250 0.04 0.21 508 0.09 0.28 
Head Widowed Dummy 754 0.10 0.30 213 0.11 0.31 541 0.10 0.30 249 0.06 0.25 505 0.12 0.33 
Head Single Dummy 754 0.01 0.12 213 0.02 0.14 541 0.01 0.11 249 0.02 0.13 505 0.01 0.12 
Any Member Accessed 
Credit in Previous 12 
months 758 0.15 0.36 214 0.15 0.36 544 0.15 0.36 250 0.23 0.42 508 0.11 0.31 
Member of Business Group 758 0.16 0.37 214 0.20 0.40 544 0.14 0.35 250 0.22 0.42 508 0.13 0.33 
Member of Religious Group 758 0.48 0.50 214 0.57 0.50 544 0.44 0.50 250 0.52 0.50 508 0.46 0.50 
Member of Political Group 758 0.10 0.31 214 0.10 0.30 544 0.11 0.31 250 0.16 0.36 508 0.08 0.27 
Member of Social Group 758 0.28 0.45 214 0.30 0.46 544 0.28 0.45 250 0.31 0.46 508 0.27 0.45 
Asset Score 667 0.00 0.96 218 0.09 1.09 449 -0.04 0.89 223 0.35 1.19 444 -0.18 0.76 
Urban Dummy 758 0.09 0.29 214 0.14 0.35 544 0.07 0.26 250 0.15 0.36 508 0.06 0.24 
Income Before 
Remittances* 2555 9562 53739 910 8207 25599 1645 10311 64206 807 18726 90339 1748 5331 19998 
Expenditure Before 
Remittances* 2555 5862 19201 910 6361 18230 1645 5585 19717 807 10378 28670 1748 3776 12081 
Household size 758 5.85 2.54 214 6.03 2.73 544 5.78 2.46 250 6.31 2.60 508 5.62 2.48 
Any Mem with Salaried Job 2555 0.18 0.39 910 0.19 0.39 1645 0.18 0.39 807 0.26 0.44 1748 0.15 0.36 
Remittance Sending 
Dummy 2555 0.32 0.46 910 0.41 0.49 1645 0.27 0.44 807 1.00 0.00 1748 0.00 0.00 
Percent of Exp=Rem 2357 0.03 0.09 865 0.04 0.10 1492 0.03 0.09 806 0.09 0.14 1551 0.00 0.00 
Remittance Receiving 
Dummy 2555 0.36 0.48 910 1.00 0.00 1645 0.00 0.00 807 0.46 0.50 1748 0.31 0.46 
Percent of Inc=Rem 2369 0.12 0.84 904 0.33 1.34 1465 0.00 0.00 784 0.08 0.22 1585 0.15 1.02 
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Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * All income and expenditure are monthly and in Malawi Kwacha (MK). Average exchange rate during 
the period of the survey was US$1=MK73.2.
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Appendix II: Correlations 
 
Table 9: Correlations between Dummies indicating Receipt of Remittances from Different 
Sources, and Sending Remittances to Different Sources 
             |         REMITTANCES IN 
             |Village  District Other Dist Other Urb Abroad  Parents Children   
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
R    Village |   0.1745*  0.0222   0.0485*  0.0479* -0.0300   0.0591* -0.0014  
E   District |  -0.0079   0.1189*  0.0394* -0.0462*  0.0321   0.0363* -0.0519* 
M Other Dist |   0.0254   0.0106   0.1098*  0.0372* -0.0216  -0.0177  -0.0083  
   Other Urb |  -0.0232   0.0079  -0.0144  -0.0071  -0.0050  -0.0091  -0.0139  
O     Abroad |   0.0065  -0.0143  -0.0118  -0.0058  -0.0041  -0.0074  -0.0114  
U    Parents |   0.0191   0.0187   0.0436*  0.0161   0.0114   0.0360* -0.0252  
T   Children |   0.0062  -0.0382*  0.0269   0.0015   0.0157   0.0083   0.0416* 
  Grandchild |   0.0121   0.0353*  0.0842*  0.0168  -0.0094   0.0307   0.0557* 
     Sibling |   0.0190   0.0075   0.0157   0.0088   0.0062   0.0163  -0.0225  
    Paternal |  -0.0078   0.0010   0.0487*  0.0132   0.0092   0.0136  -0.0152  
    Maternal |   0.0372* -0.0182   0.0171   0.0395* -0.0178   0.0319  -0.0143  
   Relatives |   0.1115*  0.0704*  0.0134  -0.0222   0.0103   0.0155   0.0067  
    Neighbor |   0.0985*  0.1053*  0.0544*  0.0214  -0.0185   0.0203  -0.0184  
      Spouse |  -0.0095  -0.0071  -0.0059  -0.0029  -0.0020  -0.0037  -0.0057  
 
             |         REMITTANCES IN 
             |Grandchild Sibling Paternal Maternal Relatives Neighbor  Spouse  
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
R    Village |   0.0017   0.1054*  0.0549*  0.0518*  0.0239   0.1054*  0.0051  
E   District |  -0.0301   0.0864*  0.0123   0.0160   0.0033   0.0885* -0.0042  
M Other Dist |  -0.0232   0.0659*  0.0372*  0.0185  -0.0130   0.0865*  0.0046  
   Other Urb |  -0.0054  -0.0145  -0.0071   0.0377* -0.0099  -0.0173  -0.0042  
O     Abroad |  -0.0044  -0.0118   0.0630* -0.0071  -0.0081  -0.0141  -0.0034  
U    Parents |  -0.0091   0.0689*  0.0161  -0.0001  -0.0015   0.0263   0.0219  
T   Children |   0.0128   0.0373* -0.0195  -0.0238  -0.0118  -0.0185  -0.0115  
  Grandchild |   0.0295   0.0519*  0.0168  -0.0164  -0.0187   0.0225  -0.0079  
     Sibling |  -0.0129   0.0751*  0.0317   0.0209  -0.0098  -0.0166  -0.0026  
    Paternal |  -0.0172   0.0669*  0.0491*  0.0315  -0.0318  -0.0061  -0.0134  
    Maternal |  -0.0191   0.0421*  0.0071   0.0762* -0.0354*  0.0273   0.0394* 
   Relatives |  -0.0167   0.0710* -0.0222  -0.0272   0.2116*  0.0638* -0.0131  
    Neighbor |  -0.0125   0.0572*  0.0532*  0.0602* -0.0113   0.1997* -0.0076  
      Spouse |  -0.0022  -0.0059  -0.0029  -0.0036  -0.0041  -0.0070  -0.0017 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * indicates significance at the 10% 
level 
 
Table 10: Correlations between Values of Remittances Received from Different Sources, and 
Values Sent to Different Sources 
             |         REMITTANCES IN 
             |Village  District Other Dist Other Urb Abroad  Parents Children   
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
R    Village |   0.0369*  0.0523*  0.0187   0.0076  -0.0037   0.1276* -0.0014  
E   District |   0.0062   0.0234   0.0119  -0.0057   0.0022  -0.0017  -0.0102  
M Other Dist |   0.0816*  0.0339*  0.0055   0.0294  -0.0064   0.0018   0.0080  
   Other Urb |  -0.0050  -0.0046  -0.0014  -0.0023  -0.0020  -0.0019  -0.0045  
O     Abroad |   0.0301  -0.0041  -0.0012  -0.0019  -0.0017  -0.0017  -0.0038  
U    Parents |   0.0841*  0.0323  -0.0020   0.0177  -0.0006   0.0080  -0.0108  
T   Children |  -0.0053  -0.0103   0.0024  -0.0032   0.0031  -0.0043   0.0359* 
  Grandchild |  -0.0021  -0.0035   0.0005  -0.0020  -0.0020   0.0003  -0.0014  
     Sibling |  -0.0031  -0.0056  -0.0015   0.0015  -0.0003  -0.0032  -0.0055  
    Paternal |  -0.0107  -0.0100   0.0067   0.0041  -0.0044  -0.0025   0.0239  
    Maternal |   0.1332* -0.0007  -0.0021   0.0518* -0.0042   0.0456* -0.0053  
   Relatives |  -0.0041   0.0476*  0.0010  -0.0043  -0.0013  -0.0034  -0.0037  
    Neighbor |   0.0495*  0.1703*  0.0617* -0.0023  -0.0059   0.3192* -0.0044  
      Spouse |  -0.0029  -0.0028  -0.0008  -0.0013  -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0026  
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             |         REMITTANCES IN 
             |Grandchild Sibling Paternal Maternal Relatives Neighbor  Spouse  
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
R    Village |  -0.0034   0.0052  -0.0047   0.0025   0.0051   0.0285  -0.0011  
E   District |  -0.0040   0.0704* -0.0048   0.0030   0.0618*  0.0252  -0.0015  
M Other Dist |  -0.0050   0.0429*  0.1572* -0.0046   0.0599*  0.0562* -0.0042  
   Other Urb |  -0.0015  -0.0032  -0.0023  -0.0020  -0.0034  -0.0040  -0.0013  
O     Abroad |  -0.0013  -0.0027   0.1191* -0.0027  -0.0029  -0.0034  -0.0011  
U    Parents |  -0.0036   0.0323   0.1013* -0.0033   0.0221   0.0369*  0.0031  
T   Children |  -0.0034   0.0014  -0.0053  -0.0071  -0.0065  -0.0028  -0.0030  
  Grandchild |  -0.0015   0.0061  -0.0023  -0.0031  -0.0034  -0.0038  -0.0013  
     Sibling |  -0.0025   0.0000   0.0257  -0.0045  -0.0050  -0.0026  -0.0021  
    Paternal |  -0.0036   0.0240   0.0009  -0.0060  -0.0080  -0.0028  -0.0031  
    Maternal |  -0.0033   0.0195  -0.0048   0.0735* -0.0073   0.1230* -0.0028  
   Relatives |  -0.0029  -0.0024  -0.0044  -0.0059   0.1750*  0.0150  -0.0025  
    Neighbor |  -0.0040   0.0333* -0.0024   0.0199   0.0231   0.1173* -0.0049  
      Spouse |  -0.0009  -0.0019  -0.0014  -0.0018  -0.0020  -0.0023  -0.0008  
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * indicates significance at the 10% 
level 
 
 
Table 11: Correlations between Shocks Suffered by Household and Remittance Received by 
Source 
 
             |                          SHOCK 
      Source |   Baby Man Married Divorced Fem Married Work Seek Work Marriage 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Village |  -0.0309  -0.0075   0.0128  -0.0292  -0.0215  -0.0185  -0.0527* 
    District |  -0.0301   0.0283  -0.0318   0.0148   0.0107   0.0247   0.0175  
  Other Dist |  -0.0285   0.0000   0.0020  -0.0228   0.0601*  0.0128  -0.0103  
 Other Urban |   0.0270  -0.0178  -0.0173   0.0143   0.0206   0.0664*  0.0056  
      Abroad |  -0.0064  -0.0125  -0.0122  -0.0313   0.0329* -0.0105  -0.0139  
     Parents |   0.0234  -0.0047  -0.0036  -0.0258   0.0217   0.0025  -0.0216  
    Children |  -0.0755*  0.0271  -0.0211   0.0462*  0.0233   0.0298   0.0469* 
  Grandchild |  -0.0220   0.0165   0.0177   0.0179  -0.0068   0.0244   0.0151  
     Sibling |  -0.0107  -0.0123  -0.0106  -0.0030  -0.0097   0.0124  -0.0246  
    Paternal |   0.0198   0.0050   0.0061  -0.0151   0.0075   0.0122  -0.0029  
    Maternal |   0.0315  -0.0218   0.0368* -0.0140   0.0043  -0.0182  -0.0167  
    Relation |  -0.0299  -0.0082  -0.0070  -0.0263  -0.0349* -0.0010  -0.0377* 
   Neighbour |  -0.0303  -0.0016  -0.0206  -0.0319   0.0005  -0.0114  -0.0335* 
    Employee |   0.0269  -0.0054  -0.0052  -0.0134  -0.0096  -0.0045  -0.0162  
         NGO |  -0.0009  -0.0083  -0.0081   0.0204   0.0955* -0.0070   0.0105  
      Spouse |  -0.0031   0.0276  -0.0102   0.0066   0.1130* -0.0088   0.0250  
    In Total |  -0.0455* -0.0012  -0.0033  -0.0223   0.0435*  0.0142  -0.0326* 
 
             |                          SHOCK 
      Source |Live Relation Death Sick Boy Sick Girl Sick Man Sick Fem Sick Mem 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Village |  -0.0253   0.0013   0.0496*  0.0553* -0.0310   0.0571*  0.0246  
    District |  -0.0358*  0.0058   0.0771*  0.0359*  0.0002   0.0133   0.0157  
  Other Dist |  -0.0020   0.0075   0.0327*  0.0016  -0.0518*  0.0312   0.0088  
 Other Urban |   0.0292  -0.0074  -0.0518* -0.0126   0.0172   0.0139   0.0181  
      Abroad |  -0.0154   0.0128  -0.0242   0.0039  -0.0066   0.0013   0.0051  
     Parents |   0.0202  -0.0016   0.0165   0.0311   0.0191   0.0178   0.0337* 
    Children |  -0.0212   0.0190  -0.0019   0.0229  -0.0326*  0.1031*  0.0502* 
  Grandchild |   0.0080   0.0087   0.0066  -0.0011  -0.0136   0.0394*  0.0253  
     Sibling |   0.0044   0.0068   0.0453*  0.0054  -0.0111   0.0261  -0.0000  
    Paternal |   0.0219   0.0054  -0.0257  -0.0217  -0.0161   0.0079  -0.0037  
    Maternal |   0.0040  -0.0192  -0.0346* -0.0224   0.0060   0.0087  -0.0112  
    Relation |  -0.0490* -0.0086   0.0993*  0.0911*  0.0206   0.0267   0.0450* 
   Neighbour |  -0.0294   0.0192   0.0487*  0.0470* -0.0232   0.0018   0.0114  
    Employee |   0.0040  -0.0099  -0.0156  -0.0147  -0.0229   0.0107  -0.0116  
         NGO |  -0.0000  -0.0154   0.0489*  0.0153   0.0065   0.0317   0.0416* 
      Spouse |   0.0224   0.0447* -0.0014   0.0016  -0.0225  -0.0152  -0.0282  
    In Total |  -0.0301   0.0213   0.0588*  0.0550* -0.0387*  0.0625*  0.0257 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * indicates significance at the 10% 
level 
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Table 12: Correlations between Shocks Suffered by Household and Remittance Sent by Source 
 
             |                          SHOCK 
      Source |   Baby Man Married Divorced Fem Married Work Seek Work Marriage 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Village |   0.0423* -0.0330* -0.0394* -0.0047  -0.0511* -0.0087  -0.0132  
    District |  -0.0095  -0.0048   0.0079  -0.0173  -0.0226   0.0222  -0.0048  
  Other Dist |   0.0034   0.0401* -0.0078  -0.0282   0.0489* -0.0017  -0.0216  
 Other Urban |  -0.0221  -0.0059  -0.0057   0.0144  -0.0105  -0.0049   0.0074  
      Abroad |  -0.0180  -0.0048  -0.0047  -0.0120  -0.0086  -0.0040  -0.0144  
     Parents |  -0.0092   0.0172  -0.0271  -0.0373* -0.0066  -0.0054  -0.0280  
    Children |  -0.0123  -0.0160   0.0103   0.0249   0.0003   0.0166   0.0171  
  Grandchild |  -0.0184  -0.0110  -0.0107  -0.0120  -0.0198  -0.0092  -0.0063  
     Sibling |   0.0121  -0.0030  -0.0156   0.0245   0.0089  -0.0256   0.0156  
    Paternal |  -0.0020  -0.0188  -0.0183  -0.0284  -0.0087   0.0358* -0.0325  
    Maternal |   0.0205   0.0181  -0.0003  -0.0187   0.0075   0.0057  -0.0122  
    Relation |  -0.0125   0.0261  -0.0178   0.0115  -0.0328* -0.0153   0.0025  
    Neighbor |   0.0264  -0.0193  -0.0171  -0.0252  -0.0252   0.0055  -0.0129  
    Employee |   0.0435* -0.0024  -0.0023  -0.0060  -0.0043  -0.0020  -0.0072  
      Spouse |  -0.0090  -0.0024  -0.0023  -0.0060  -0.0043  -0.0020  -0.0072  
    In Total |   0.0238  -0.0260  -0.0221  -0.0149  -0.0338* -0.0018  -0.0177  
 
             |                          SHOCK 
      Source |Live Relation Death Sick Boy Sick Girl Sick Man Sick Fem Sick Mem 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Village |   0.0192  -0.0041  -0.0188  -0.0194   0.0313   0.0064   0.0153  
    District |   0.0015  -0.0099   0.0073   0.0006   0.0344* -0.0178   0.0358* 
  Other Dist |   0.0166  -0.0193  -0.0238  -0.0109  -0.0077  -0.0003  -0.0111  
 Other Urban |   0.0651* -0.0109  -0.0171  -0.0162   0.0343*  0.0046   0.0294  
      Abroad |   0.0354* -0.0089  -0.0139  -0.0132  -0.0205  -0.0035  -0.0223  
     Parents |  -0.0257  -0.0094   0.0164   0.0133  -0.0002   0.0191   0.0144  
    Children |   0.0134  -0.0155  -0.0178   0.0061  -0.0022   0.0280   0.0038  
  Grandchild |   0.0174  -0.0204  -0.0182  -0.0158  -0.0047   0.0086  -0.0187  
     Sibling |   0.0331*  0.0054   0.0006  -0.0125   0.0552* -0.0197   0.0322  
    Paternal |  -0.0000  -0.0226  -0.0134  -0.0171   0.0083  -0.0081  -0.0097  
    Maternal |   0.0417* -0.0058  -0.0087  -0.0108   0.0535* -0.0077   0.0360* 
    Relation |  -0.0462* -0.0214   0.0567*  0.0381* -0.0068   0.0143   0.0304  
    Neighbor |   0.0224   0.0240  -0.0445* -0.0440*  0.0024  -0.0138  -0.0109  
    Employee |   0.0442* -0.0044  -0.0070  -0.0066  -0.0102   0.0309   0.0186  
      Spouse |   0.0442* -0.0044  -0.0070  -0.0066  -0.0102  -0.0127  -0.0211  
    In Total |   0.0146  -0.0061  -0.0190  -0.0184   0.0339* -0.0118   0.0192 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; * indicates significance at the 10% 
level 
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Appendix III: Selected Statistics by Survey Round 
 
Table 13: Receipt of Remittances from Different Geographical Areas 
Survey Round Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
          
% Receiving Remittance from Home 
Village/Urban Area 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.40 
  (.34) (.37) (.31) (.49) 
Average Received from Home Village/Urban Area 31.94 26.33 24.55 70.64 
  (310.13) (186.07) (217.95) (236.04) 
% Receiving Remittance from District (not home 
village or urban area) 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.22 
  (.27) (.31) (.27) (.42) 
Average Received from District 17.16 35.75 33.87 107.51 
  (127.62) (402.12) (312.62) (367.77) 
% Receiving Remittance from Other Districts 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.15 
  (.24) (.26) (.24) (.36) 
Average Received from Other Districts 23.15 23.72 257.60 99.55 
  (195.83) (169.24) (4816.4) (545.2) 
% Receiving Remittance from Other Urban Area 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  (.16) (.16) (.13) (.11) 
Average Received from Other Urban Area 9.16 16.31 17.10 16.73 
  (76.26) (209.42) (321.24) (203.45) 
% Receiving Remittance from Overseas 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
  (.11) (.07) (.1) (.13) 
Average Received from Overseas 24.09 18.07 9.94 38.00 
  (422.53) (427.62) (130.9) (424.81) 
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
Table 14: Receipt of Remittances from Different Relations 
Survey Round Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
          
% Receiving Remittances from Parents 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
  (.18) (.17) (.16) (.22) 
Average Received from Parents 5.60 3.73 17.74 5.97 
  (58.06) (39.46) (273.18) (69.05) 
% Receiving Remittances from Children 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.15 
  (.23) (.22) (.26) (.36) 
Average Received from Children 19.25 18.46 42.96 77.31 
  (153.09) (131.25) (419.83) (316.55) 
% Receiving Remittances from Grandchildren 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
  (.09) (.09) (.1) (.16) 
Average Received from Grandchildren 1.12 0.29 1.31 9.77 
  (15.13) (4.71) (14.06) (130.83) 
% Receiving Remittances from Siblings 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.15 
  (.24) (.27) (.23) (.36) 
Average Received from Siblings 17.87 56.28 37.51 78.38 
  (163.7) (621.41) (490.52) (548.68) 
% Receiving Remittances from Paternal Relatives 0.02 0.04 0.01   
  (.15) (.2) (.11)   
Average Received from Paternal Relatives 7.01 7.60 2.88   
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  (105.22) (68.21) (38.77)   
% Receiving Remittances from Maternal 
Relatives 0.03 0.06 0.03   
  (.17) (.24) (.16)   
Average Received from Maternal Relatives 3.94 4.98 5.50   
  (38.09) (34.23) (63.29)   
% Receiving Remittances from Unspecified 
Relatives     0.21 
      (.41) 
Average Received from Unspecified Relatives     56.14 
      (242.75) 
% Receiving Remittances from Unrelated 
Neighbors 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.23 
  (.28) (.3) (.23) (.42) 
Average Received from Neighbors 25.80 24.28 9.52 44.51 
  (281.21) (191.44) (123.06) (213.8) 
% Receiving Remittances from Spouses 0.01 0.01 0.01   
  (.11) (.09) (.08)   
Average Received from Spouses 21.49 3.21 7.69   
  (416.21) (44.48) (115.37)   
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
Table 15: Remittances Sent to Different Geographical Areas 
Survey Round Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
          
% Giving Remittance to Home 
Village/Urban Area 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.23 
  (.4) (.4) (.33) (.42) 
Average Given to Home 
Village/Urban Area 17.75 23.51 22.33 66.71 
  (103.79) (119.45) (130.98) (622.04) 
% Giving Remittance to District 
(not home village or urban area) 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.12 
  (.31) (.36) (.31) (.33) 
Average Given to District 40.23 24.96 25.32 49.71 
  (642.38) (136.75) (151.24) (306.14) 
% Giving Remittance to Other 
Districts 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
  (.22) (.2) (.19) (.17) 
Average Given to Other Districts 24.64 17.29 21.67 35.45 
  (186.4) (175.56) (197.66) (314.57) 
% Giving Remittance to Other 
Urban Area 0.00 0.00  0.01 
  (.04) (.05)  (.08) 
Average Given to Other Urban 
Area 5.94 0.79  14.03 
  (163.45) (14.93)  (238.48) 
% Giving Remittance to Overseas 0.00 0.00    
  (.06) (.04)    
Average Given to Overseas 4.47 0.07    
  (84.93) (1.94)     
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; standard deviations in parenthesis. 
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Table 16: Remittances Sent to Different Relations 
Survey Round Jan-00 Nov-00 Jul-01 Jul-02 
          
% Giving Remittances to Parents 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 
  (.23) (.22) (.19) (.22) 
Average Given to Parents 22.19 11.39 11.31 40.48 
  (175.31) (68.83) (86.84) (456.52) 
% Giving Remittances to 
Children 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  (.12) (.12) (.14) (.14) 
Average Given to Children 1.54 2.81 5.85 14.19 
  (19.68) (28.37) (49.76) (141.8) 
% Giving Remittances to 
Grandchildren 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (.1) (.09) (.09) (.08) 
Average Given to Grandchildren 6.05 2.45 0.97 2.81 
  (163.45) (52.98) (14.11) (43.47) 
% Giving Remittances to Siblings 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 
  (.23) (.25) (.23) (.23) 
Average Given to Siblings 36.29 13.74 14.82 23.34 
  (643.19) (140.96) (106.03) (244.65) 
% Giving Remittances to 
Paternal Relatives 0.03 0.04 0.02   
  (.16) (.2) (.14)   
Average Given to Paternal 
Relatives 4.78 6.38 3.72   
  (62.61) (57.36) (44.24)   
% Giving Remittances to 
Maternal Relatives 0.03 0.05 0.03   
  (.18) (.21) (.17)   
Average Given to Maternal 
Relatives 8.39 4.26 3.19   
  (104.33) (30.42) (26.85)   
% Giving Remittances to 
Unspecified Relatives     0.11 
      (.32) 
Average Given to Unspecified 
Relatives     64.61 
      (442.86) 
% Giving Remittances to 
Unrelated Neighbors 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.13 
  (.37) (.37) (.27) (.33) 
Average Given to Neighbors 8.22 24.91 12.87 12.38 
  (38.22) (175.23) (100.31) (65.09) 
% Giving Remittances to Spouses 0.00     
  (.04)     
Average Given to Spouses 0.22     
  (6.17)       
Source: Author’s calculations using Complementary Panel Survey; standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
